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Abstract
Because the less informed incorrectly estimate asset returns, they anticipate higher returns from
their risky investments. They thus over-invest in risky securities. They are rewarded by higher total
portfolio returns. Too high a proportion of less informed investors lowers the return on risky assets.
Equilibrium requires that the less informed’s rate of return equal the informed’s. The less informed
control a stable equilibrium percentage of total wealth. Because an individual’s recent investment
experience correlates with his terminal wealth, learning need not reduce the less informed’s risky asset
exposure. Implications exist for the slope of the return versus systematic risk curve.
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Should we expect security markets to be efficient? Academicians usually argue that information
is readily available and investors are intelligent and motivated. Practitioners and students often respond
by pointing to less informed, or even ignorant, investors who did well in the market (Uncle Joe
perhaps). The academician then admits that some less informed individuals exist. (What academician
who grades exams could doubt this?) It is then argued that the less informed would normally lose
money to the informed. Thus, the informed would come to manage the vast bulk of the investment
funds, (assuming no new less informed investors enter the market). The less informed should end up
managing such small sums that they have little effect on prices. Thus, the price setting process should
be dominated by the well informed, wealthy investors.
Milton Friedman's statement of this position is widely quoted (1953, p. 175), “People who
argue that speculation is generally destabilizing seldom realize that this is largely equivalent to saying
that speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilizing in general only if speculators on the
average sell when the currency is low in price and buy when it is high.”
However, recently a problem with this argument has been pointed out. In an efficient, or a
mildly inefficient market, the informed may make money at the expense of the less informed. The
reason for this is that financial theory predicts that risk taking is rewarded (see Reilly 1989, Bodie,
Kane, & Marcus 1993, Elton & Gruber, 1995, or any other text). Those taking greater risks can earn a
higher rate of return. Poor information and inadequate security analysis often lead to taking greater
risks. If the return gained from the extra risk taken by the less informed exceeds the losses due to poor
security selection, the less informed will experience a higher rate of return on their total portfolios than
the better informed. The wealth of the less informed will grow more rapidly than the wealth of the
informed. Of course, this argument assumes that all things other than information are being held
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constant. In particular, the less informed and the uninformed are presumed to have the same risk
preferences.
As a simple example of this argument, consider the numbers reported in the widely used Reilly
text (1989, p. 46), where stocks have expected earnings of roughly 10% (the reported 9.9% rounded)
and a large standard deviation of 21.1%, and risk-free securities and bank accounts earn 4% (the
reported 3.5% rounded). As any finance text explains, investors choose the asset mix that maximizes
their utility. Those that choose to buy more stock (because they are more tolerant of risk) earn more on
average than those who are averse to risk and stay primarily, or even entirely, in bank accounts, bonds,
and other low risk assets.
What determines the actual return earned by classes of investors, such as the less informed? I
would suggest that it is their asset mix, the fraction of their assets put in stocks and other risky assets
relative to that put in low risk assets, including bank accounts and bonds. Brinson, Hood, and
Beebower (1986) found that for large pension plans, asset mix explained 93.6% of the variation in total
portfolio return. Asset mix is likely to be just as important for classes of individual investors. To
determine whether the less informed earn more than the informed, we must ask whether the less
informed are more likely to invest in risky asset classes, such as stocks. It will be argued that they are.
How should we model the behavior of the less informed? I would suggest that ignorance leads
to mistakes. These mistakes could arise from the widely discussed overreaction (De Bondt & Thaler
1985, 1987, Jegadeesh & Titman 1993) or from a tendency to hold losers too long (Shefrin & Statman
1985). It could be from the errors that lie behind any of the numerous biases (Shefrin, 2000) and
anomalies that have been discovered (see Jacobs and Levy 1988, or Haugen, 1999a, b, for a list and for
references). However, the argument here doesn’t really depend on the nature of the mistakes, merely
that they occur. The simplest model is that their mistakes are random, equally likely to raise or lower
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the returns from the stock or bond being considered. Such errors might be thought of as being
distributed approximately normally). The investors, while not all-knowing, and not perfectly informed,
will be presumed to be rational, and to act rationally, given their knowledge. In particular, the reader
can think of them as using Markowitz optimization, either formally or informally (i.e., making
judgements that approximate optimization without formally going through an optimization process).
With random errors, a few securities will appear to provide extremely profitable opportunities.
Suppose the less informed investors believe they have identified stocks that will yield 50% per year.
These investors believe the potential return for taking the risk of investing in such a stock to be an extra
46%, rather than the true 6%. Naturally, the less informed will invest more of their wealth in such high
return opportunities than will the better informed investors.
Investors concentrate on the securities they believe will have the highest returns, and reduce
their holdings of the others to zero. If the returns from a stock are underestimated, the holdings are
typically reduced to zero. The asymmetry arises in some countries because short selling is prohibited. In
the countries where short selling is allowed (such as the US) few investors are willing to make short
sales. Among individuals, the less informed are unlikely to even understand the mechanics of short
selling. Most American institutional investors are forbidden to make short sales.
Not surprisingly, the risky part of the less informed investors’ portfolio is less diversified than
that of the better informed investors. This need not imply that they are undiversified. Given the
textbook assumptions (efficient market that is pricing consistent with the capital asset pricing model,
lending rates equal to borrowing rates, no transactions costs or indivisibilities), each investor holds
some of every stock. If less informed investors make errors, they will believe some stocks are over
priced, and others under-priced, causing them to purchase more of the latter, and probably none of the
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former. However, if they are rational (as is here assumed) portfolios will still be designed to provide
adequate diversification (see discussion below).
In at least one simple utility function, the fraction of the investor’s wealth put into risky
assets is proportional to the risk premium he anticipates earning on these risky assets. Other plausible
utility functions would yield similar results. Admittedly, arguing that the less informed and less
sophisticated investors go through a formal optimization process is unrealistic, but the resulting
conclusion appears well founded.
The above argument does not depend on less informed investors' underestimating risk
(although they probably do).1 All that is required is that they overestimate the returns from some
stocks, which will normally be the ones they include in their stock portfolios. They may underestimate
the returns from other stocks, but these are not included in the portfolio. Such overestimation is quite
consistent with unbiased estimates of the returns from each individual stock, since the estimated returns
conditional on selection for inclusion in the portfolio can be expected to be biased upwards.
Random overestimation implies that the less informed will invest a substantially greater
proportion of their wealth in risky assets than the better informed. This outcome is especially likely if
the investor believes he has identified several unusually good current opportunities (chances of a
lifetime), but does not expect similar future opportunities.
One implication of the above is that (given the same wealth and risk preference) the less
informed will play a greater role in the market for risky assets, such as stocks, than would otherwise be
expected given their share of the population and wealth.
Given the traditional efficient market assumption, in which prices fully reflect available
information, the expected rates of return on assets reflect only their systematic risk, as any standard
textbook explains. It also follows that the expected return on any portfolio will depend only on its
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systematic risk. It then follows that the portfolios of the less informed, reflecting a higher level of
systematic risk because of a higher proportion of stocks and other risky assets, should earn higher rates
of return. Thus, the surprising conclusion is that the less informed investors should do relatively better
than the informed investors, contrary to the speculations of Friedman and others.
Some readers may be bothered by the idea of markets being efficient in spite of the presence of
less informed investors. The difficulty probably arises because the usual textbook treatment of efficient
markets assumes everyone has perfect information. However, a belief in an efficient market does not
require such an unrealistic assumption. Many uninformed trades cancel out other uninformed trades.
More importantly, with many well informed investors, as well as many poorly informed investors,
minor divergences from theoretically correct prices can persuade the better informed investors to hold
the stocks that the less informed neglect. The result is close to an efficient market, even if not a
perfectly efficient one.2
Black (1986) has pointed to the importance of noise in understanding financial markets. The
above argument not only incorporates noise traders, but more importantly provides an explanation for
why they may persist over time. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman3 in a series of papers made
the very important point (on which this paper builds), that less informed investors may earn a higher
rate of return on their total portfolios (stocks plus risk free assets) because they believe they have a
more favorable risk-return opportunity and hence invest in securities with a higher return. Thus, the
wealth of the less informed may grow more rapidly than the wealth of the informed.
The above demonstration that the less informed investors should earn higher rates of return than
better informed investors creates problems for efficient market theory. If they consistently earn more
than the informed investors, their wealth should come to be a steadily greater percentage of the funds
invested in the market, and the informed investor’s percentage of the market should steadily shrink,
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approaching zero if given enough time. After a long enough period of time, the informed investors must
control such a small share of total wealth that their trades (offsetting those of the less informed
investors) can no longer insure efficient markets.
Notice this implies a logical inconsistency in mainstream theory. Markets are argued to be
efficient because informed investors’ trading keeps them efficient. This requires that informed investors
control some appreciable fraction of the wealth. However, it was just shown that, in the long run, the
share of the wealth of informed investors in equilibrium tends towards zero. Such near zero shares of
the wealth held by informed investors implies that markets will not be efficient.
Actually, the situation is worse than that discussed above. Becoming well informed costs money
(information and security analysis are not free). This should reduce the rate of return earned by those
investors who become informed. This effect serves to pull the rate of return earned by informed
investors even further below that earned by the less informed, making the textbook theory even less
defensible.
Admittedly, a belief in the survival of the less informed or less rational traders does not require
the absence of short selling. If random errors are made in the rates of return on securities, the return
from taking on additional risk will be overstated, leading investors to take on riskier positions,
producing the scenario described above.
There is a more theoretical point; in the long run those that maximize the geometric mean of
their returns over time obtain the highest growth rates for a portfolio. This is achieved by investors with
a logarithmic utility function. However, Samuelson (1971) has pointed out that rational investors need
not have the logarithmic utility function that maximizes long run wealth growth. There may be
individuals operating with less than perfect information whose strategies produce portfolios with a long
run geometric average rate of return that exceeds those of more rational or better informed investors.
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The ratio of the wealth of one of these investors to a completely rational, well-informed individual
increases the further one looks into the future. Given the wide variety of poorly informed strategies or
irrational ones, it is highly likely that at least one of these has a higher expected long run geometric
average rate of return than any of the strategies that rational individuals might adopt. In the long run
(leaving aside saving and dissaving issues) if new investors do not enter or leave the market, these less
informed investors will come to dominate the market, as has been pointed out by Shefrin & Statman
(1994) and Blume & Easley (1992).
Usually, when a logical application of a theory leads to ridiculous conclusions (or ones
demonstrably false), one looks to find an assumption behind the theory that is either incorrect, or a
poor approximation of reality. One then replaces this assumption with a better one.
II. WHY LESS INFORMED INVESTORS EVENTUALLY COME TO AFFECT PRICES
As the percentage of wealth controlled by the informed investors decreases, eventually a point is
reached where the buying of the less informed bids up some stock's price. Normally, this will occur after
the informed have reduced their holdings to zero (i.e. are constrained by the relevant short selling
restriction), and the few willing to go short have the largest positions they are comfortable with, or are
legally allowed to hold.
Once this position is reached, further buying by the less informed must raise the price. This
increased price draws forth additional selling, either from less informed investors, or from informed
investors who are willing to take a larger short position if offered a higher price. At this point, the
assumption of a flat market demand curve becomes untenable.
At what point this state is reached depends on several factors. One is the extent to which
different, less informed investors are purchasing the same stock. If all less informed investors are making
the same mistake, they will all be putting the same stocks into their portfolio in more than the market
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proportion, and the stocks will more quickly reach the level of holdings at which most informed investors
have sold out.
If the less informed investors differ among themselves, some of the buying will be matched by the
selling of other less informed investors. The net impact on the market will be reduced, and the wealth of
the informed investors can shrink to a lower level before the buying by the less informed investors
impacts appreciably on any stock prices. However, given the assumptions stated above, sooner or later
the relative wealth of the informed investors will decline to such a low level that the assumption of
efficient markets no longer holds.
The only exception to the above argument is if, through incredible luck, the less informed
investors are buying stocks in exact proportion to the market portfolio. In this case, the share of the
wealth held by the uninformed can keep growing faster than that of the informed. Thus, the share of the
total wealth held by the informed investors will decline steadily towards zero. Only then can prices stay at
the level predicted by efficient market theory even as the informed's share of the wealth approaches zero.
This outcome is sufficiently unlikely that it need not be taken seriously.
Thus, let us drop the unrealistic assumption made earlier that informed investors can keep prices
at the level predicted by efficient market theory.4 Instead, the less informed investors will be presumed to
be able to bid prices up. Such bidding up of prices lowers the rate of return earned on these securities.
For instance, one might imagine that the less informed could bid up by 25% the prices of the stocks
found most attractive, before the lowered return discouraged any further purchasing. If this happens, the
set of stocks that the less informed think promise high returns might actually yield only 8% (this is the
10% a typical stock would have earned, divided by 1.25). Such lower returns on their stocks obviously
reduce the returns on their total portfolios, but still leave it possible for the aggregated portfolios of the
less informed to outperform the aggregated portfolios of the better informed. Fortunately, it is easy to
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calculate whether with this lower return the total (risk free assets included) portfolios of the less informed
would still outperform the total portfolios of the informed.5 If the less informed's aggregate portfolios
would still outperform that of the better informed, their share of wealth would keep growing.
III. AN EQUILIBRIUM WEALTH DISTRIBUTION?
The above suggests an equilibrium distribution of wealth between the less informed and the
informed (or across different ability levels). The reason is that unless the wealth distribution is such that
the wealth of the informed and the less informed grow at an equal rate, the fraction of total wealth
controlled by one group will be changing. As explained below, increasing the share of wealth controlled
by either group lowers that group’s rate of return, thus slowing the growth of that group’s wealth.
Conversely, a decrease in the share of wealth of either group increases that group’s rate of return, thus
increasing that group’s rate of wealth growth. Thus, there are equilibrating forces that tend to return the
shares of wealth to the level where the wealth of both groups grow at the same rate.
If the relative rates of return on total portfolios are the same for two groups (and if both groups’
net consumption are equal percentages of their total wealth), the two portfolios will grow at equal rates,
leaving the equilibrium wealth distribution unchanged. The logic is trivial. Let Wi be the informed initial
wealth, Wu be the less informed initial wealth, ri be the rate of return over one year earned by the
informed on their total portfolio, and ru be the rate earned by the less informed. After one year informed
wealth is (1+ri)Wi, and less informed wealth is (1+ru)Wu. The wealth ratio after one year R is given by
R=(1+ri)Wi/(1+ru)Wu
If ri=ru, it follows that the new wealth ratio is Wi/Wu which was the original ratio. Thus, if the
equilibrium distribution of wealth between the informed and less informed investors is somehow
achieved, it will persist.
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To refer to this distribution of wealth as an equilibrium one it is necessary to show that if the
distribution of wealth is other than this, there are mechanisms that return the distribution to this
"equilibrium state."
Insert Figure 1 here
The basic argument can be seen on Figure 1, which plots the difference in total portfolio returns
versus the wealth ratios for the informed and the less informed investors. Remember the total portfolio is
defined to include both the risk-free and the risky assets. Line ABC shows how the differential return
declines as the wealth ratio increases. A horizontal line is drawn through the value of 0 for the difference
in the total portfolio rates of return. Only when there is no difference (i.e. the difference is 0) does the
wealth ratio remain stable. The equilibrium value for the wealth ratio occurs where this horizontal line is
cut by the line ABC. Of course, an equilibrium value for this ratio implies an equilibrium share of total
wealth for the less informed.
If the income distribution differs from that required for equal total portfolios, rates of return will
change so as to move the wealth distribution towards this equilibrium. If the informed have less than their
equilibrium share of wealth, the difference of the total return ratio will exceed 0. This situation is shown
by a position on the line AB. Their wealth will increase relative to that of the less informed. This is shown
by the direction of the arrow. This movement will continue until the equilibrium at B is reached.
If the ratio of the informed wealth to the less informed wealth exceeds the equilibrium ratio, the
differences in their total rates of return will be below 0. This situation corresponds to a position on line
BC. The ratio of the informed’s wealth to the less informed’s wealth will decline, causing a movement
along line BC towards B. This is shown by the arrows. Again, the movement will continue until the
equilibrium at B is reached.
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Thus, if the ratio of the informed’s wealth to the less informed’s wealth is other than D, forces
arise in the form of different rates of return on the respective total portfolios, which tend to return the
ratio to its equilibrium value. Thus, the equilibrium situation requires that the total wealth of the two
classes grow at the same rate.
The argument can be put in symbols. Let the subscript i refers to the informed, and the subscript
u to the less informed, w to the fraction of wealth in risky assets, and Rf to the risk free rate of return,
Ri is the return to risky investment for the informed, and Ru the return for the less informed. If
wiRi+(1-wi)Rf > wuRu+(1-wu)Rf, then the fraction of total wealth in the informed’s portfolios will
increase. This will cause Ri to decrease until wiRi+(1-wi)Rf= wuRu+(1-wu)Rf. If wiRi+(1-wi)Rf <
wuRu+(1-wu)Rf, then the fraction of wealth controlled by the less informed will increase, causing Ru to
decrease until again wiRi+(1-wi)Rf= wuRu+(1-wu)Rf.
Thus, the distribution of wealth between the less informed and the informed will be such that
wiRi+(1-wi)Rf = wuRu+(1-wu)Rf, regardless of the initial wealth distribution.
IV. SOME SIMPLE NUMBERS
To see if such an equilibrium is consistent with plausible numbers, let us look at some simple
numbers. If the informed invest half their wealth in stocks earning 10%, and invest half in risk-free assets
earning 4%, their average return would be 7%. If the less informed have bid certain stocks up so that
they earn only 8%, this could be offset by their having three quarters of their wealth in stocks, and only a
quarter in risk-free assets. They would also earn 7%. The wealth of both groups would then be growing
at 7% per year, and there would be an equilibrium.
What would be required to induce the less informed investors to put three quarters instead of half
of their assets in stocks? Suppose both groups of investors have a simple quadratic utility function that
causes one believing the risk premium to be 6% to invest half of their assets in stocks. All that would be
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necessary for the less informed to invest three quarters of their assets in stocks, would be for them to be
convinced that the set of stocks they intended to invest in would earn 13%.6 Such an outcome seems
possible.
Imagine the less informed have a portfolio building rule of investing in the 25 best stocks (a
number believed adequate for diversification). Suppose the universe of stocks contains a thousand stocks,
whose average return is expected to be 10%. However, the less informed make small errors in estimating
the returns from these thousand stocks, and conclude they have identified 500 they think will outperform
the market (i.e. have positive alpha). Since they desire a portfolio with 25 stocks, they choose the top 5%
of these for inclusion in their portfolio. It seems very plausible that their errors could be large enough to
convince themselves that this 25 stock portfolio will outperform the market by 3%. (Unbiased estimates
of expected returns whose standard error is 1.5% would be more than adequate to produce the
hypothesized overestimation, since a 3% excess return is approximately 2 standard deviations away from
the mean). They would anticipate an expected return of 13% from their chosen portfolio. This would be
adequate to induce them to keep three quarters of their wealth in stocks.
Indeed, it seems implausible for a market to be so perfect that the informed never err about the
expected returns from stocks, and the less informed have a standard error of only 1.5 percentage points.
Yet, such a minor imperfection in forecasting of means by some investors can sustain a market in which
some stocks are priced to yield 8% and others 10%. Larger errors could yield markets with greater
imperfections.
The author does not find it implausible that it would take many years (even using sophisticated
statistical methods) for the investors who thought they were good enough to pick a 25 stock portfolio
(out of an universe of a thousand stocks) that would have an expected return of 13% to discover that
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their stock portfolios only earned 8%, and that a shift to a new forecasting technique (or a new advisor)
would not solve the problem.
Boldt and Arbit (1984, p. 30) have pointed out that it would take 30 years of data to confirm at
the 95% probability level that a manager able to earn an excess return of 7.1% was not merely benefitting
from measurement error. This point, which has been made repeatedly in different forms, is usually used to
argue against selecting managers on the basis of historical success. However, the same problem affects
individuals trying to evaluate their own relative skill. Even if they keep accurate records of their
investment performance, it will take many years of experience for them to have statistically significant
evidence that they have, or do not have, skill.
It is easy to imagine death eliminating investors before they learn that they, or their advisors, lack
expertise. Their place in the less informed group would be taken by new investors who thought they
could beat the market by 3%.
For simplicity, the analysis has been done with only a single group of less informed investors.
There could be several groups of less informed investors. For instance, some may trade excessively and
experience much reduced returns. Another group may be very gullible and fall regularly for frauds. Such
investors have low, or even negative returns. Over time such investors' share of the total wealth declines.
Thus, the less informed investors that drive this model are not grossly uninformed (although such may
exist), but those whose errors have the primary effect of causing them to purchase more of the risky
assets than they otherwise would. It is these investors who are most likely to affect prices.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS
Notice the equilibrium described here differs from the standard efficient markets equilibrium. In
an efficient market there is no opportunity to identify securities that offer higher than normal risk adjusted
returns using publicly available information. Thus the best that can be done is to diversify widely,
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minimize the resources devoted to researching securities, and minimize turnover by a buy and hold
strategy.
In contrast, in the model outlined here, there could be some overvalued and undervalued
securities that can be identified with publicly available information. Securities that are popular with the
less informed investors are bid up, causing them to have lower rates of return. Other securities, whose
merits the less informed don’t recognize, have higher returns. In the example discussed initially, the less
informed had bid certain securities up by 25%, causing the expected return (as estimated by the informed
investors that made the effort to estimate it) to fall to 8%, when other investments were earning 10%. If
analysis could separate the 8% stocks from the 10% ones, the increase in returns could justify the
increased expense of an active investment policy, especially for investors that have substantial sums to
invest (such as institutional investors).
Such a market has been called a bounded efficient one (Miller 1987). Investment analysis covers
its cost not by finding winners, but by avoiding losers (Miller 1978). The optimal strategy becomes to
study a small portion of the universe of stocks intensely, hoping to identify overpriced ones that the less
informed have bid up. Once these have been identified, and enough stocks have been purchased to
provide the desired diversification, additional search brings few gains (and has costs). When the stocks
the informed buy are earning 10% (if of average risk), identifying more 10% stocks does not raise the
average return earned by the portfolio. Thus, informed investors do not take a position in all available
stocks, but only in those correctly priced for the risk.
Finally, notice that the above model provides a clear rationale for security analysis. In the
academic efficient market model, there is no reason to do security analysis, and hence no reason to hire
security analysts. In the above model, with a large number of less informed investors bidding certain
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stocks up, it is possible for the better informed investors to earn more than the less informed through
security analysis. This provides a rationale for the existence of security analysts.
VII. THE EFFECT OF LEARNING
Many believers in textbook efficient market models will argue that investors could not
consistently deceive themselves, convincing themselves that they can pick stocks well, while experiencing
normal or even subnormal returns. Admittedly, a long series of disappointments may cause investors to
shift towards a more conservative strategy. However, security returns are highly variable, and it is easy to
rationalize away failures and attribute success to genius. A failure can be attributed to a mistake that has
now been learned from, and hence will not be repeated.
Unfortunately, many individuals do not realize the power of compound interest. A stock investor
who earns the average 10% per year will double his money in a little more than 7 years. Doubling your
money is impressive, and it is easy for such an investor to convince himself that he has unusual skill which
will prevent the losses others experience.
It is important to remember that high risk portfolios have highly variable outcomes. Many holders
of such portfolios do very well. And many do very poorly. Let us look at the plausible reactions of each
of these groups of individuals to their experiences. Those who have done very well attribute their success
to skill rather than luck. They are likely to conclude that they (or their advisors) indeed have the ability to
select high return stocks. As a minimum they will continue with their high risk, ignorance-based strategy.
If anything, they are likely to increase the fraction of their wealth invested in risky assets. Possibly, they
will borrow to increase the amount invested.
Admittedly, there will be many investors who are unlucky as well as less informed, or imprudent.
Some of these may learn from their experience. Many of them will merely decide what their mistake was,
and resolve to avoid it in the future. Unfortunately, there are many possible mistakes to be made, and
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they are free to make another. Again, if their errors are random, these errors will lead them to believe
they have some very high return opportunities available, if they will only accept the risk. Again, they may
be lucky or unlucky. If lucky, they act as described in the previous paragraph, and continue investing
heavily in risky assets. If unlucky, they again identify their mistakes, decide to avoid making them a
second time, and proceed to make new ones.
Admittedly, this sequence may continue long enough so that the investors eventually learn. What
they have to learn is the psychologically difficult fact that they are not as smart, or not as informed, as
they would like to think. Many people will not admit this to themselves. This tendency to believe good
things about ourselves actually serves useful psychological purposes. For one thing, it is generally in our
interest to have others believe good things about ourselves. In turn, it is hard to persuade them to hold
these opinions if we do not hold them about ourselves. Evolutionary psychologists believe that such
abilities to deceive ourselves were probably selected for during evolution (Lockard & Paulhus, 1988;
Trivers, 1990).
The alternative is to master the extremely sophisticated idea that when there are random errors in
estimation, one is likely to systematically overestimate the returns from a project if one acts as if one’s
best estimates were truly the expected returns from the project. This is true even if one’s estimates are,
on average, unbiased estimates of the expected returns. This is a very difficult concept to master (judging
from the author’s difficulty in communicating it to PhD and MBA students) which was introduced to the
professional finance literature only in the late seventies.7 Since the idea is still not in the MBA textbooks,
few of the less informed investors will discover it on their own.
In considering whether investors will continue with less than optimal strategies (such as investing
on their own estimates of the potential returns), it is important to remember what psychologists have
discovered in animal conditioning experiments. Rats have been found to continue longer in a particular
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behavior pattern if they are rewarded on a random schedule (a variable ratio schedule) than if they are
rewarded every time the desired action is performed. Gambling is argued to be reinforced on such a
variable ratio schedule (Kalat 1990, p. 264).
The theory applied to gambling probably also extends to investing in risky assets. If less informed
investors are occasionally rewarded for investing in risky assets by large winnings, they are likely to
persist in their investment behavior for a long time, probably longer than if they were consistently
rewarded with small winnings. Indeed, being consistently rewarded with small winnings is more likely to
be the experience of the well informed investor. After making accurate estimates of the returns from
different assets, the well-informed investor diversifies widely and then puts much of his wealth into a riskfree asset.
However, it is plausible that investors learn, and eventually those who have a long run of moneylosing stocks will reduce the percentage of their wealth invested in stocks. However, the important thing
to notice is that bad luck and ignorance may have already reduced their wealth to the level where altering
their asset allocation will have little market impact.
Consider two less informed investors who each invests $20,000 in stocks, convinced they each
have exceptional skill. After several years, the unlucky one has reduced his money to a fifth of what he
had, or $4,000. He finally concludes he lacks skill, and decides to take a fifth of his wealth out of the
market. There is now $800 less invested in stocks.
What of the other investor, the lucky one? To be symmetrical with the one who has lost all but a
fifth of his money, imagine his stocks have risen fivefold. His $20,000 in stocks is now $100,000. He also
is capable of learning from experience. Seeing his stunning investment success, he decides he is a good
stock picker. He decides to put an amount equal to 20% of his wealth more into the market (This
requires opening a margin account). This decision raises his commitment to risky assets by $20,000.
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Notice what learning has done. The net effect of investor learning is that the lucky one increases
the amount committed to risky assets by $20,000, and the unlucky one decreases it by $800. The net
effect is an $19,200 increase in the money in the market.
Yes, investors do learn from their experience. However, the interaction of luck and learning from
experience implies that, all other things being equal, those who have earned high rates of return have
more money than those who have earned low rates of return. If learning leads to equal percentage shifts
in wealth committed to risky assets (or similar effects through adjusting estimated future returns), those
with favorable experience will have more wealth, and will shift more money into risky assets than the
unlucky investors with poor recent experience will shift away from risky assets. Thus, allowing for
learning can increase the tendency for the less informed class of investors to invest a higher fraction of
their wealth in risky assets, and to earn a higher return on their total portfolios, increasing the fraction of
the market’s wealth they control.
Because of the correlation of wealth with historical experience, reevaluations of skills based on
investment experience may easily increase the stock commitment of the less informed investors, taken as
a group. These are the ones who are most likely to evaluate their expertise by their recent experience,
rather than doing a correct Bayesian assessment that includes correct prior probabilities (based on the
expertise and motivation of competitors) for them actually having unusual expertise.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Because the less informed tend to make more errors in evaluating returns on risky assets, they
anticipate higher returns from the risky assets they choose. This causes them to invest more of their total
wealth in risky securities. In a perfectly efficient market, where all securities have the same risk adjusted
returns, this will cause the less informed investors to earn higher total returns.
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However, a higher return (not offset by differences in saving rates) on one group’s portfolio
implies that this group’s share of total wealth will increase. A perpetually increasing share of wealth for
the less informed group is inconsistent with the continuance of efficient markets.
For equilibrium with multiple groups, the rate of growth of the wealth of each group must be the
same. In the absence of saving differences, this implies that differences in the fraction of wealth invested
in risky assets must be offset by differences in the average risk premiums earned on risky assets. This
equilibrium, and the forces maintaining it, can be shown with a simple graph.
Differences in saving behavior between groups can be easily incorporated into the model.
Because errors in return estimation likely correlate with systematic risk, the slope of the security
market line is reduced because less informed investors bid up the prices of securities whose systematic
risk is high.
It is unlikely that learning will eliminate this effect for several reasons. Some are psychological.
However, because an individual’s investment experience is correlated with his end of period wealth,
equal percentage shifts in the allocation to risky assets (or equivalent changes in beliefs) increase total
funds allocated to risky assets.

Footnotes
1

There are several reasons for suspecting that estimation errors may both overestimate returns and

underestimate risks. One is that people in general tend to be overconfident (Shefrin, 2000, pp. 48-51)
and this leads to underestimating risks.
One reason is that there is a large number of things that can go wrong (lawsuits, entry of
competitors, new government regulations, product recalls, etc.) which are individually of low
probability, but collectively important. To simplify the analysis investors often place the probability of
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these events at zero, rather than at the correct low number. Failure to consider the possibility of such
adverse events both raises returns and lowers risks.
Also, both firms and brokers have incentives to promulgate good news and information about
the possibility of favorable events. Thus, most less informed investors are likely to have heard about
possible good news (say a new product in development, or the potential cost saving from a new
management). However, there is less incentive to publicize bad news, and the less informed investors
may not have discovered some adverse facts.
2

Certainly there is considerable evidence that markets are close to efficient (for a recent review,

see Fama 1991). The consistent failure of institutional investors to outperform the averages shows that
markets are close to efficient, even if not perfectly efficient (Dunn and Theisen 1983, Brinson, Hood,
and Beebower 1986, Bogle 1991, Figures 4 and 5, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1992). As long as
mistakes do not appreciably change the rates of return on the securities bought because of these
mistakes (which requires merely that mistake-inspired trades be offset by better informed investors'
trades), the portfolios of the mistake prone, being riskier, should earn higher rates of return than the
portfolios of the informed. Of course, this assumes that the uninformed do not trade so often as to lose
most of their income through spreads and commissions.
Admittedly, Ippolito (1989) reported that mutual funds slightly outperformed the indices, a fact
which he interpreted as showing some stock picking ability. However, most of this advantage was
consumed by management fees and other expenses, as theory would predict. Thus, even conceding this
degree of skill, the wealth in these mutual funds would not be growing faster than that of less expert
individual investors who did not have the mutual funds’ management expenses.
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3

De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman, (1991) have argued that some investors frequently make

errors in estimating variability of security returns, normally being overconfident about their predictions,
and have shown that such investors can survive and possibly come to dominate in markets. They give
very little consideration to incorrect estimates of rates of return, saying (p. 5), “Moreover we assume
the misperceptions of different noise traders about a particular asset are correlated, for if all traders
confused about the returns on a stock have different misperceptions, their trades will cancel out." I
explicitly do not make this assumption here.
While De Long et al. (1990b, p. 731) assert that equity underpricing “is a necessary condition
for noise traders to earn higher expected returns,” this argument shows they can earn higher returns
simply because they put more of their total portfolio into risky assets, and more into risky assets with
higher systematic risks, regardless of whether equities as a whole are underpriced. An earlier statement
by the same authors (De Long et al. 1990a, p. 731) states, “Finally, as we showed in earlier work, if
trader’s mistakes cause them to take positions that carry more market risk than rational investor’s
positions, they can earn higher return in the market even if they make judgement errors.” However, in
their 1991 paper these authors clearly recognize and show that investors who err about individual
securities can earn higher returns. The earlier work referred to, while not explicitly referenced, is
apparently an earlier draft of the noise paper (here referenced as De Long et al. 1990b). Finally, in a
summary paper, Shleifer and Summers recognize that noise traders can earn higher expected returns in
the market through undertaking higher risks, but they make the puzzling comment that “Almost for
sure, they fail to affect demand in the long run” (1990, p. 25).
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4

Readers may ask why the case of uninformed investors forcing prices down is not discussed. There

are several reasons. One is that the arguments are symmetric, and if the case of prices being forced up
is understood, the case of prices being forced down is the reverse.
However, there are several reasons for concentrating on the case where the uninformed bid
prices up. One is that most uninformed investors are probably unwilling or unable to sell short. Many
individual investors do not understand short selling, and hence will not engage in it. The uninformed
investors are likely to be disproportionately represented in this group. Thus, if they underestimate
returns from a stock, they are likely to reduce their holdings to zero, and then stop selling. This limits
the amount of downward pressure on prices their mistakes cause.
Consider, a case where investors make errors of plus or minus 20% in the expected returns
from stocks in a market where the average stock is believed to yield 10%. Most investors making
downwards errors will reduce their holdings to zero. Few will sell short. Hence those who do not hold
the stock (typically a majority) will not be willing to go short, and will do no selling. The effective
impact on the market will be limited, and most likely offset by buying from the informed investors,
leaving the price unchanged.
However, every investor who overestimates the return by 20% is likely to be a buyer (even if
holdings had previously been zero). This makes it much more likely that the error-induced buying will
be large enough to change the price. Thus, the concentration in the body of the text on error-induced
buying rather than error-induced selling.
5

The total earnings of the informed investors Rti is given by
Rti=Rf + wi(Ri-Rf)

and for the uninformed investors by

(7)

24

Rtu=Rf + wu(Ru-Rf)

(8)

where w is the fraction of wealth in risky assets, Rf to the risk free rate of return, Ri is the return to
risky investment for the informed, and Ru the return for the uninformed. The subscript i refers to the
informed investors, and the subscript u to the uninformed ones. The total rate of return on the
portfolios of the uninformed will exceed that of the informed if
wu/wi > (Ri-Rf)/(Ru-Rf)

(9)

In words, the necessary condition for the uninformed investors to earn more on their total portfolio is
for the fraction of their portfolio invested in risky assets to rise by a higher percentage than the
reciprocal of the fraction by which the risk premium they earn on risky assets is reduced. For this to
happen seems quite plausible.
6

See footnote 1 for the demonstration that the percentage of assets in the risky assets is proportional to

the anticipated risk premium for such a utility function. If the less informed investors believe the risk
premium on the set of stocks they will purchase is 9% (13%-4%), rather than 6% (10%-4%), they will
invest 50% more in stocks than the fully informed investors.
7

See Miller 1978 for an exposition (the first to my knowledge), with a worked out example.the most

recent exposition is Miller (forthcoming).
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